Middle East Blowback and Syria

Jackson Diehl and I have different ideas of what constitutes "blowback". I see "blowback" as the unintended consequence of foreign policy and military actions. He sees it as... I'm not quite sure.

At best, Libya will be a steady, low-grade headache for Obama in his second term. But the worst blowback from his policies will come in Syria. What began as a peaceful mass rebellion against another Arab dictator has turned, in the absence of U.S. leadership, into a brutal maelstrom of sectarian war in which al-Qaeda and allied jihadists are playing a growing role. Obama’s light footprint strategy did much to produce this mess; without a change of U.S. policy, it will become, like Bosnia for Bill Clinton or Iraq for George W. Bush, the second term’s “problem from hell.”

Diehl complains that President Obama's approach to Libya resulted in Gadhafi's fall from power, but showed little concern for what would happen to the nation afterward.

[A] Rand study concludes that stabilizing Libya will require disarming and demobilizing the militias and rebuilding the security forces “from the bottom up.” This, it says, probably can’t happen without help from “those countries that participated in the military intervention” — i.e. the United States, Britain and France. Can the Obama administration duplicate the security-force-building done in Iraq and Afghanistan in Libya while sticking to the light footprint? It’s hard to see how.

Diehl does not appear to be arguing that we should now occupy Libya, disarm its mlitias, and rebuild the nation from the ground up. He presents no argument that U.S. policy in Libya contributed to the civil war in Syria.

The U.S. is faced with four choices in Syria: Cease all current efforts and let the chips fall where they may, keep on the current course of sanctions and selective support for certain resistance, escalate into a Lebanon-type limited military engagement designed to cause Assad's regime to collapse, or invade, occupy and rebuild. Obama's "light footprint" policies in Libya did nothing to produce the mess in Syria. Diehl seems to be choosing loaded language, irrelevant to the situation, to try to make the Obama Administration responsible for Syria's civil war, and then to convince his readers that the only responsible action that can now be taken is an Iraq- or Afghanistan-style occupation and "bottom up" nation building.

Does Diehl actually believe that's plausible given our nation's recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, even under a different President? Even if we weren't still in a painfully slow period of economic recovery? Can Diehl at least explain why "It will be different than what happened the last two times we invaded and attempted to reinvent predominantly Muslim nations as progressive democracies," or "It will be different from our most recent incursions in nations that are dominated by warlords"? Because if not, the blowback isn't what would be leading us into the conflict - it would be what we would experience if we follow Diehl's counsel.

Few outside of Iran, the Putin Administration and Assad's inner circle want his regime to survive, but policy on how to achieve that end and what might follow should be predicated upon more than wishful thinking and an implied blank check payable by the U.S. taxpayer.

Spinning On An Axis

Michael Tomasky is concerned about developments in the Middle East, and not without cause:

The news broke two days ago across the region about Syria supplying Hezbollah with Scud missiles. Syria denies but it seems to be true, and if true it raises the stakes there considerably, because Scuds have a longer range than anything Hezbollah is now assumed to have. What that statement really means, boiled down to its essence, is that they can reach Tel Aviv and Jerusalem.

The issue thus becoming, will Israel attack Lebanon to try to eliminate the Scuds, effectively proving that Hezbollah with Scuds is no more capable of deterring an attack than was Hezbollah without Scuds? In which case, what's the point of the Scuds?

With regard to Syria, the administration's attempted engagement with Assad has so far been one of its genuine failures. If US overtures to the country are met with responses like this, they're pretty clearly not working. And it gives Syria more influence in Lebanon, which breaks explicit promises Joe Biden and Hillary Clinton made in early visits to Beirut. The poor Lebanese are used to this, alas, and their country typically bears the brunt of these failures -- a war will likely scar its landscape more than Israel's or Syria's.

In fairness to the President, the well was poisoned before he got there. We can imagine alternative histories in which one of Israel's past Prime Ministers sprouted a backbone, stood up to the settlers and negotiated a resolution of the conflict with Syria. We can similarly imagine worlds in which the U.S. embraced the death of Hafez al-Assad as an opportunity to inspire his son, Bashar, to turn away from Iran and embrace modernity. Unfortunately instead we got Bush's foreign policy ineptitude, quickly followed by "Axis of Evil" rhetoric that contributed to Bashar's rejection of sensible measure would have been Syria's best option, using 9/11 as an opportunity to break with its past, negotiate the resolution of its conflict with Israel, and inviting western aid and development.

Tomasky points to Simon Tisdall's theories about why Syria might be interested in giving Scuds to Hezbollah... insurance against another Israeli attack, disappointment that President Obama hasn't "rebooted" the peace process (especially in relation to the Golan Heights), closer collaboration with Hezbollah as part of an effort to re-establish Syrian influence in Lebanon, and highlighting the double standard that Israel can have a huge nuclear arsenal, and for that matter a gargantuan arsenal of conventional arms, rockets and missiles, while most its neighbors are expected to have no appreciable offensive or defensive capacity. But I think he's focusing on the wrong country.

I can't imagine Syria exporting Scuds to Lebanon without the blessing of Iran. This suggests that Iran wants to increase the deterrent effect of attacks from Lebanon that might follow an Israeli attack on Iran, something Israel's been threatening for years. And while it makes little sense for Syria to draw itself into another war in Lebanon, Iran may look at the Israeli invasion and occupation of that nation as "the good old days" - with the U.S. bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan, and Israel again occupying Lebanon, Iran's need to worry about any concerted military action against its territory will plummet. No doubt other people lose, but from the perspective of Iran the consequences for Lebanon do not appear to be a concern - whether the Scuds increase deterrence or lure Israel into a costly war and occupation, it seems like a win for the mullahs.

Tomasky also links to Blake Hounshell's aptly named article, The dumbest country in the Middle East. With all due respect to Tisdall's speculation on how Syria might benefit from Scuds in Lebanon, Hounshell's perspective seems more accurate to me. The best outcome for Syria in an armed conflict with Israel is that it only gets its nose bloodied. Hounshell speculates that the pressure for the deal is coming from Iran, "to show the West that any strike on its nuclear facilities would be extremely costly for the United States and its allies." Yeah, but what a way to treat those allies.

Krauthammer on Perfidy

Oh, why didn't he see this coming.... Poor Charles Krauthammer and friends, taken in by the evil French:

But we underestimated French perfidy. (Overestimating it is mathematically impossible.) Once the resolution was passed, France announced that instead of the expected 5,000 troops, it would be sending 200.

Well, speaking of math, if it's not possible to overestimate French perfidy, then it follows that French perfidy is infinite. If French perfidy is infinite, you would have to be stupid to underestimate it. So when Krauthammer says "we", he would seem to be admitting to at least situational stupidity, which would be fitting given that he is almost always a fount of frothy irrationality on issues relating to the Middle East.

But step back for a moment here. This force, even at a "full" 15,000, would be tiny compared to our commitment in Iraq. Heck - it would be pretty darn small as compared to our commitment in South Korea - is that number still about 37,000? So what's really going on? Perhaps the U.S. realizes two things: First, anybody who deploys troops in Lebanon risks having troops killed, and second, Lebanon doesn't have oil. Perhaps Mr. Krauthammer needs to consider that despite this nation's overwhelming support for Israel's right to exist and be secure within its borders, we don't see a compelling need to shed U.S. blood to secure that nation's northern border.

Shaking his fist angrily at France and sputtering angrily about that nation's perfidy doesn't change the fact that the U.S. entered into the ceasefire deal without first getting troops committed to the peacekeeping force, nor does it change the fact that we're expecting those troops to come from nations other than our own. Despite the implications of his mathematical formula, surely Mr. Krauthammer would not contend that the U.S. or his beloved President were suckered into supporting the ceasefire deal - the Bush Administration's political leaders and diplomats joined it with their eyes wide open.

Krauthammer suggests two contexts when multilateralism is valuable:

This is considered a radical change of course. It is not. Even the most ardent unilateralist always prefers multilateral support under one of two conditions: (1) There is something the allies will actually help accomplish or (2) there is nothing to be done anyway, so multilateralism gives you the cover of appearing to do something.

Perhaps he doesn't recognize the Bush Administration's variant on #2: If you could do something but you don't care enough to invest your nation's resources, multilateralism again provides that nice cover.

Those Darn Subsidies

Having been wrong, yet again, on the Middle East and his prediction that Hezbollah would be blamed for the damage to Lebanon once a ceasefire took hold, in War on Daddy's Dime, Thomas Friedman takes on subsidies:

I’m not sure yet who’s the winner in the war between Hezbollah and Israel, but I know who’s the big loser: Iran’s taxpayers. What a bunch of suckers.

Isn’t it obvious? As soon as the reckless war he started was over, Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, declared that Hezbollah would begin paying out cash to the thousands of Lebanese families whose homes were destroyed. “We will pay compensation, a certain amount of money for every family to rent for one year, plus buy furniture for those whose homes were totally destroyed,” said Nasrallah. “These number 15,000.”

I guess we'll leave aside for the moment the contradiction between Friedman's opening sentence, asserting that Iran's taxpayers are footing the bill, and his overall thesis, which is that Iran's rulers use state oil revenues to provide massive subsidies to keep their people reasonably content.

I understand why Mr. Friedman is upset. He predicted that Hezbollah would take a post-war P.R. hit and be blamed for the bombing damage, but here they are using Iran's oil wealth in a manner that may well further expand their popularity. It is also beyond obvious that high oil prices provide huge revenue streams to many undesirable regimes. But isn't this really an expression of his upset at having been blindsided by the obvious?

I have to admit that I am amused by statements like this:

To buy public support, Iran’s regime subsidizes housing, gasoline, interest rates, flour and rice.

What sort of nation, after all, would subsidize its oil industry? Offer subsidized housing or interest rates? Or subsidize agricultural products? Why, I even understand that there's a country which instituted subsidies on bee farming during WWII so that they would have sufficient beeswax to waterproof munitions for overseas shipment - and those subsidies remain in place, for no good reason, even today.... Where do you suppose that could be? (More here.) Perhaps Mr. Friedman should join forces with the Club for Growth.

Oh, I'm not arguing that U.S. subsidies are equal in scope, or have the same direct purpose as those in nations like Iran and Syria, but then what about Kuwait - are its subsidies okay, even though it remains a misogynistic dictatorial monarchy, because it isn't belligerent? Last I checked, its subsidies of its population made Iran's look small.

If we could cut the price of crude in half, it would mean that all of Iran’s oil income would go to subsidies — which would be unsustainable and therefore a huge threat to the regime.

Well, in theory.... But in practice, they made it through 2004 and early 2005, so even assuming an unlikely plunge in oil prices to a "mere" $35/bbl I think they would somehow keep up the bad fight.

Lebanon's Army To Control The Southern Border Region?

I may be a proverbial monkey hammering away at the keys, trying to produce Shakespeare, but apparently I actually anticipated what is now being proposed as a (partial) solution to the Israel-Lebanon war:

The Lebanese army called up 5,000 reservists last night to prepare for deployment along the border to try to speed up the departure of Israeli forces, the main hurdle to the United Nations security council adopting a ceasefire resolution.

The Lebanese army will only be deployed when Israel and Hizbullah agree to end hostilities.

The army, regarded as neutral by Israel, has not been involved in the present conflict. Its deployment would mark a significant change in the balance of power within the country: for more than 20 years southern Lebanon has been a virtual no-go area for the Lebanese army.

And so the poor Lebanese Army appears destined to go where any international military force would fear to tread....

The Air War vs. The Ground War

Jonathan Chait writes,

Let's face it, Israel's counter offensive in Lebanon doesn't seem to be going very well. Liberals are saying it. Conservatives are saying it. Plenty of Israelis are saying it. But here is the odd thing: nobody is paying very careful attention to the alternative. The criticism of Israel's ground campaign - however sound much of it may be - takes place against an assumption that peace could be at hand if only Israel stopped fighting.

A valid point, which sidesteps the real issue - the primary criticism has been of Israel's air campaign. It was (and is) so poorly designed and executed that you can only wonder if Israel intends to make Hezbollah the most popular and powerful force in Lebanon for the indefinite future.

Take a Krauthammer, Simmer off the Vitriol, Add a Dash of Chomsky....

And you have a recipe for a very unusual Krauthammer column, in that it's worth reading. As it turns out, when he stops telling us how much he hates everybody he perceives as an enemy of Israel and why we should share his sentiments, space appears in which sapience can emerge.

That dash of Chomsky.... One of Norm Chomsky's consistent points about U.S. Middle Eastern policy is that it is about what is in the perceived best interest of the United States, and to the extent that it is U.S. policy to support a strong Israel it is because fundamentally the U.S. views that as being in its best interest. Krauthammer seems to share that opinion:

Israel's war with Hezbollah is a war to secure its northern border, to defeat a terrorist militia bent on Israel's destruction, to restore Israeli deterrence in the age of the missile. But even more is at stake. Israel's leaders do not seem to understand how ruinous a military failure in Lebanon would be to its relationship with America, Israel's most vital lifeline. ... [In U.S. foreign policy] The question, as always, is: What have you done for me lately? There is fierce debate in the United States about whether, in the post-Sept. 11 world, Israel is a net asset or liability. Hezbollah's unprovoked attack on July 12 provided Israel the extraordinary opportunity to demonstrate its utility by making a major contribution to America's war on terrorism.

Like Chomsky, Krauthammer perceives that self-interest drives U.S. policy toward Israel. Like Chomsky, he overstates his case - I don't think you can look at the recent sense of Congress resolution, passing with a 410:8 vote, and not recognize that Israel's position is far from precarious. But I think they both sense what can happen, and what likely will happen, if in fact the consensus becomes that U.S. support for Israel is contrary to U.S. interests. Even if manifested only through the substitution of absentions for vetoes in U.N. Security Council votes pertaining to Israel.

I should note also that I agree with Krauthammer that Hezbollah is a threat to Israel and to the region, and that it would be a good thing if Hezbollah's military capacities were eliminated. I do differ from Krauthammer in that he apparently believes that Hezbollah could be defeated through a short-term ground war, but very much agree that Israel's air war represents an atrocious choice of tactics.

The United States has gone far out on a limb to allow Israel to win and for all this to happen. It has counted on Israel's ability to do the job. It has been disappointed. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert has provided unsteady and uncertain leadership. Foolishly relying on air power alone, he denied his generals the ground offensive they wanted, only to reverse himself later. ...

His search for victory on the cheap has jeopardized not just the Lebanon operation but America's confidence in Israel as well.

I think Krauthammer recognizes but intentionally sidesteps the implications of his position. It certainly isn't the case that Israel cannot roll in the tanks and troops and have its ground war, even after its exceptionally destructive but tactically ineffectual air campaign. To the extent that a military victory can be won on the ground, nothing in the air campaign has limited Israel's opportunity for success, and arguably the destruction of Lebanese infrastructure would help Israel in a ground war. So the defeat Krauthammer perceives as being plucked from the jaws of victory would apparently be one of public perceptions and sentiment. It's not just a loss in the war by proxy against Iran ("The defeat of Hezbollah would be a huge loss for Iran, both psychologically and strategically.") It's that the tactics used have caused a lot of people in the West to question whether Israel holds the moral high ground, and have caused a significant backlash within Lebanon which could lead to a quick resurgence (temporary or long-term) of Hezbollah once the war ends.

A loss to Hezbollah may not mean much militarily for Israel or the West, but it means a lot psychologically. Hezbollah is already being perceived (yet again) on the Arab street as a heroic entity defeating a much more powerful adversary. It would exemplify the attitude we are (supposedly) working hard to change - that fundamentalist, militant Islam can bring pride and victory, even in the face of (decadent) Western imperialism. It of course doesn't help a bit that the Bush Administration eschews diplomacy, and thus rules out any resolution to this type of conflict which might illustrate a better way.

I may be more cynical than Krauthammer, who puts the blame for the poor choice of an air campaign on Israel's political leaders. I don't believe for a second that the U.S., in giving what Krauthammer desribes as "the green light -- indeed, the encouragement" to Israel to embark on this war, was not aware of Israel's intended tactics. Nobody said, "Hey - wait a second, that's not a good plan." Nobody stepped in when it became obvious that Israel intended to defeat Hezbollah primarily through air power and said, "We need to get them to bring in ground troops", or even "We should force a quick ceasefire to give Israel its 'victory' before it becomes obvious that this isn't working." Why? In my estimation, because the U.S. knew what Israel planned, and deemed it an appropriate manner in which to wage war against Hezbollah - perhaps even the preferred manner. After all, wouldn't a victory primarily through air power stand as vindication for Rumsfeld's vision of how wars should be fought?

[Updated to fix broken link.]

A Solution for Lebanon?

Oh, it's probably ultimately unworkable, but so is every other solution.

The context: Israel (and most of the rest of the world, apparently including most Arab states) wants to see Hezbollah disarmed. It could not achieve disarmament through eighteen years of occupation of southern Lebanon, and is now attempting to achieve disarmament through an air campaign which will, in all likelihood, destroy much of Hezbollah's arsenal while increasing Lebanese and Arab enmity toward Israel and sympathies with Hezbollah - like the occupation, a recipe for short-term gain and long-term pain. Israel has never wanted any significant international military force on its borders (and after the last time it was attempted not many foreign militaries have much interest in trying to act as peacekeepers). Israel distrusts the United Nations, and no UN force would be of sufficient size and strength to disarm Hezbollah.

So... How about trying something completely different? Bring in a UN force to monitor Lebanon's borders with Syria. Bring in a sufficient foreign miltary and police force to maintain order and stability in those areas of Lebanon north of the Litani River while the Lebanese military responds to Hezbollah. And make Lebanon and its military, supported by contributions of foreign training and military hardware, responsible for policing and controlling areas controlled by Hezbollah, including Lebanon's border with Israel. (Ideally, subject to practical limitations and security issues, the Arab states which oppose Hezbollah could be enticed to contribute manpower to any police force required as part of this effort, such that under most day-to-day circumstances the man on the street in Lebanon would encounter the face of an Arab policeman rather than a foreign soldier.) The people of Lebanon will see for themselves in Hezbollah is willing to kill Lebanese soldiers in order to maintain its military operations - something that should bring some sense of sobriety to the notion of Hezbollah as fighting for Lebanese independence and freedom from foreign occupation. And it keeps western forces off of the front lines.

If this plan were to work you should end up with a well-trained, well-disciplined Lebanese army which can ultimately maintain control of the entire nation, reducing the likelihood that Hezbollah will again be able to develop a significant militia. Perhaps a Lebanon that looks something like Jordan - but with an elected government instead of a monarchy.

"It Couldn't Happen Here...."

In a scathing attack on gerrymandering, the Washington Post opines:

In some areas, open competition between political parties gave way to deal-cutting that foreordained most results and so depressed turnout.

Oops - my bad. That was about Lebanon.

Wouldn't It Be Nice

Today, the Times has printed an editorial favoring the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon. The author appreciates the new U.S. sanctions against Syria, but only as a first step:

The sanctions may be helpful, and the United States has long called for an end to the Syrian military presence of Lebanon — just last week President Bush said that "the people of Lebanon should be free to determine their own future, without foreign interference or domination." But the Bush administration, working with the European Union, should be doing more to encourage Syria's withdrawal.

The author notes, most likely in recognition of the protracted civil war which plagued Lebanon from 1975-1990, that Lebanon has the potential to explode:

American sanctions have heightened pressures on Mr. Assad. Yet by themselves they will not improve Syrian-Lebanese relations. In fact, trying to force a Syrian pullout may be dangerous. It could lead to domestic tension in Lebanon that Syria would highlight, and even encourage, to reaffirm its indispensability to civil peace.

But beyond that intimation, the author doesn't hone in on the reasons why the U.S. is probably not pressing for withdrawal, with or without European participation.

First, Syria is unlikely to agree to any withdrawal from Lebanon unless it achieves Israel's withdrawal from the Golan Heights. Despite coming close to an agreement under Barak, the Sharon Administration does not want to return the Golan Heights to Syria, giving Syria an excuse to walk away from any discussions on Lebanon.

Second, Europe would likely press for a resumption of Israeli-Palestinian peace talks. The Sharon Administration does not want to engage in peace talks, as it wishes to perpetuate the myth that "there is no one to talk to" and wants nothing that will interfere with its unstated plan to annex much of the occupied West Bank.

Third, to avoid the collapse of Lebanon into a renewed civil war, the West would likely have to deploy tens of thousands of peacekeeping troops to the region for several years. The United States is already overcommitted in Iraq. European nations are likely to comment that they have already committed significant numbers of troops to present, more pressing peacekeeping efforts (e.g., the Congo Region), and are likely to observe that there are areas of the world, such as Darfur, far more in need of immediate intervention than Lebanon. They are likely to also consider the past experience of peacekeeping troops in Lebanon - experience which helped inspire even Reagan to "cut and run".

It would be nice to achieve peace and democracy for Lebanon - and a more wise or pragmatic administration might have made Lebanon a model for economic development and democratization in the Middle East rather than invading Iraq - but at present there does not appear to be the political will to achieve that end.