Is it Really Hamid Karzai Who is Confused?

Stephen Biddle and Michael O'Hanlon opine,

For most Americans, Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s words and actions are difficult to understand and hard to accept. He often seems ungrateful for the efforts of U.S. troops, cavalier in his ideas of how to change the Afghan-NATO military campaign and irresolute in his commitment to the war effort. He has suggested that our troops stay out of Afghan villages even before Afghan forces are ready to handle security there. He has chastised NATO soldiers for occasional, and clearly unintentional, mistakes that led to civilian casualties. He has withheld a promise to give our troops legal immunity if they stay in his country beyond 2014. He has even equated the U.S. role in prolonging the war with that of the Taliban.

We are among those who wish Karzai would stop this behavior.

So far, nothing to explain Karzai's behavior, just a wish that it will stop. Insert obligatory 'wish' clip here:

Come on. It's not like Karzai's the new kid in town. He was selected to govern Afghanistan more than a decade ago. His predilections are well known and, at this point, even predictable. The authors explain,

Karzai is not, as some have claimed, crazy or a fool. He is confused.

Seriously, he was selected by the U.S. and put in charge of Afghanistan back in 2001. He's been presiding over as much of his country as the U.S. can control for more than a decade, he has access to local Afghans, the military, the CIA, U.S. political leaders, and... he's confused? If that's true, then he is fairly characterized as a fool. If he's no fool, it stands to reason that the people who are confounded by his actions are the ones best characterized as confused.

In his view, the world’s only superpower is surely able to defeat a ragtag force of Taliban guerrillas — if it really wanted to. In his view, the United States could surely force Pakistan to stop harboring Afghan Taliban insurgents — if it really wanted to. Yet Washington does neither. On the contrary, Karzai watches Americans look the other way while their logistical contracts are siphoned off to support the Taliban (albeit less so lately), and he sees Americans give billions of dollars in aid each year to their ostensible Pakistani tormentors. Karzai concludes that there must be some hidden reason for the apparent contradictions.

We could start by traveling back in time to 2002 or so, when people like Michael O'Hanlon were cautioning us that an invasion and occupation of Iraq would require a massive military force and many years to complete, then proceeded to cheerlead for military intervention. Somebody in the position of Hamid Karzai might look at the shift of attention and military resources from Afghanistan, the Taliban and the ungoverned regions of Pakistan, as evidence that the U.S. could have done more for Afghanistan and its immediate region but chose other priorities. The authors admit as much in their essay - while conveniently neglecting to mention O'Hanlon's own support for the Iraq war.

A president of a nation like Afghanistan might consider, "What happened to the last president of this nation, put in place by a foreign power, after that power's priorities changed," and be a bit... nervous. Particularly if he considers that during the last years of that president's rule, after withdrawal of the foreign power, the western world looked on and speculated, "How long can the Soviet puppet government last," with it eventually collapsing and being replaced by the Taliban, in early 2001 received significant U.S. financial support based upon their being anti-drug.

The message to Karzai, or anybody else in his position, is that they can only count on the U.S. to serve its own interests, and that once the U.S. withdraws they have to choose between staying in the country and trying to govern based upon their own political and military power, or getting out before another collapse. A lot of people in Karzai's administration seem focused on the latter approach - skim and loot as much money as possible, stash it overseas, and prepare for a very comfortable "life in exile". But if you give Karzai the benefit of the doubt, he is not so much trying to undermine the U.S. as he is trying to position himself to survive and govern once the U.S. withdraws - so again, if we're assuming Karzai is no fool, while we might prefer that he not engage in acts of self-preservation that conflict with U.S. goals for the region, and while we may prefer that he find other ways to prepare for the future, we should not find his actions to be confusing.

The authors concede that many of Karzai's "apparent contradictions are unintended byproducts of U.S. efforts to craft a nuanced policy". That is, a balance between the "limited" security interests of the U.S. in Afghanistan, vs. concerns about al-Qaeda. The authors don't mention that a stable Pakistan is considerably more important to the U.S. than a stable Afghanistan. By this point the authors are contradicting their earlier insinuation, that Karzai is inferring "hidden reason for the apparent contradictions" in U.S. policy, and are effectively admitting that the U.S. could do more to defeat Afghan guerrillas or to pressure Pakistan (or act unilaterally) to strike Taliban forces on the other side of the Pakistani border, but that the U.S. has other priorities.

In the author's words, Karzai "frequently elevate his domestic political interests above the needs of his alliance with the United States or of the war effort." That's not "confusion" - that's grasping the reality of the situation. To the extent that the authors are correct, that Karzai displays a level of emotional instability that is not helpful, it's reasonable to respond that his personality is no secret. Whether is outbursts are genuine or calculated, it's reasonable to infer that he does enough to advance U.S. interests to remain in power. The fact that he's engaging in actions that frustrate O'Hanlon and Biddle suggests that he wants to maintain that hold on power, rather than hopping onto the last helicopter out of Kabul when U.S. forces finally depart. Frankly, if you're concerned about the future of Afghanistan, you should be more concerned about a president who always bends to the will of the U.S., as odds are he's planning a future in exile and... if he's not, odds are you'll be dealing with his successor a very short time after U.S. forces withdraw.

The Washington Post Wants Us Out of Afghanistan?

Of course not. Hiatt and his boys serve up a typically insipid, unsigned editorial suggesting the opposite. But their image of us standing on the edge of a slippery slope, with their hands at our back ready to push us down, is in may ways a compelling argument to bring our experiment to an end:

One of the rhetorical questions frequently tossed out in the debate over Afghanistan concerns the brewing trouble in Somalia and Yemen, both of which are known to host al-Qaeda cadres and training camps. If it's necessary to pacify Afghanistan to protect U.S. security, goes the taunt, must we also intervene in Somalia and Yemen?

The presumed answer is: "Of course not -- and therefore why bother with Afghanistan?" The more sensible response is: If something is not done soon about these lawless places, one or the other may well become the next Afghanistan -- a place where U.S. military intervention was compelled by a devastating attack on the homeland.

In other words, although it (as usual) has no concept of what a victory would look like or how it would be achieved, and no explanation of how it would improve U.S. security, the Post wants us to invade every nation that could become "the next Afghanistan". When Hiatt and friends pose the rhetorical question, "If it's necessary to pacify Afghanistan to protect U.S. security, goes the taunt, must we also intervene in Somalia and Yemen?" they have already rejected the answer, "Well, maybe it's not necessary to pacify Afghanistan." The only "solution" they can conceive involves spending additional trillions to invade additional nations that we can't realistically pacify, forcing the al-Qaeda camps into other "lawless nations" or across the border into "friendly" states that become de facto safe havens, and in turn become increasingly radicalized and destabilized.

Even if we assume that we have the money and troops to fund unlimited war, how is that a recipe for the long-term security of the United States? What is the actual danger to U.S. interests posed by these training camps? Could it be that it's U.S. military action that's causing al-Qaeda to metastasize, inspiring it to extend into other nations where anti-U.S. sentiment is high and new recruits are easy to find? Where those camps, and associated military action, destabilize neighboring countries? Might we not be more secure if the camps were concentrated in Afghanistan? For that matter, how much direct danger do these camps pose to U.S. interests? The training that put us most at risk wasn't that learned in Afghan camps - it was the training terrorists obtained at U.S. flight schools.

Where can we find even slight evidence that al-Qaeda is any more tied to Somalia than it was to Afghanistan... fighting them "there" so we don't have to fight them "here" doesn't work so well if they leave, let us fight the locals, and carry on business as usual from other nations, and can easily return to fill any void we leave behind. Hiatt doesn't seem honest enough to admit it, but his board's editorial boils down to "Everything we've tried so far has failed, so let's double down!"

Friedman's Constant Call for Muslim Protests

It's one of those days when Thomas Friedman phones in his column. Yes, again (and again, and again) it's "if only the Muslim world would take to the streets to protest Muslim terrorism" columns. It's not that in a larger sense he doesn't have a point - it would be nice if there were a greater outcry against terrorism within the Muslim world. But it's just plain silly for Friedman - a man whom I doubt has ever participated in the public protest of anything - to keep returning to this notion that the only meaningful Muslim reaction to terrorism would be their taking to the streets with torches and pitchforks.

Friedman complains that if Muslims take to the streets to protest offenses against other Muslims and their religion, they should take to the streets with the same vigor over crimes committed by other Muslims. We'll leave aside for the moment that nobody seems to actually do that - people sometimes take to the streets to protest the actions of their own government, but I can't recall a single instance, anywhere, of people of any religion taking to the streets to protest the actions of terrorists merely because they happen to share their faith or ethnicity. But let's pretend for the moment that Muslims are unique in that respect. Perhaps we should look at how somebody described protests in the Muslim world:

Where Islam is imbedded in authoritarian societies it tends to become the vehicle of angry protest, because religion and the mosque are the only places people can organize against autocratic leaders. And when those leaders are seen as being propped up by America, America also becomes the target of Muslim rage.

It's also worthy of note that those authoritarian regimes take advantage of what one might deem "fake issues" - things they don't really care about, but which stir up the people - as an opportunity to let the people take to the streets and vent rage that might otherwise be directed at the government.

But where Islam is imbedded in a pluralistic, democratic society, it thrives like any other religion.

That, apparently, is why Friedman doesn't call upon the Muslims of India to protest acts of terror by other Muslims. Although it would be easier for them to do so.

What would be the goals of the protests Friedman wants to see? Somebody once suggested,

Throughout history, successful social protest movements have had one thing in common - a clear, simple message and objective. Whether it was the women's rights movement or the anti-Vietnam-War movement, the mere uttering of the name immediately conjured up who the protesters were and what their objective was.

Friedman takes note of Pakistani expressions of concern, anguish and solidarity, but that's not enough for him:

But while the Pakistani government’s sober response is important, and the sincere expressions of outrage by individual Pakistanis are critical, I am still hoping for more. I am still hoping — just once — for that mass demonstration of “ordinary people” against the Mumbai bombers, not for my sake, not for India’s sake, but for Pakistan’s sake.

Why? Because it takes a village. The best defense against this kind of murderous violence is to limit the pool of recruits, and the only way to do that is for the home society to isolate, condemn and denounce publicly and repeatedly the murderers - and not amplify, ignore, glorify, justify or “explain” their activities.

What's the simple message that Friedman expects the protest to convey? "Hey, hey, ho ho, Lashkar-e-Toiba has got to go"? How many Lashkar-e-Toiba members does Friedman believe hang out in Islamabad? How many members of that group do you think care about the opinion of anybody in Pakistan who is not on board with their cause? A protest is going to change that?

The recurrent theme to Friedman's columns is his professed belief that, "Muslim protests against terrorism by Muslims would dry up the pool of recruits." The first problem is, Lashkar-e-Toiba isn't focused on the "three rivers of rage" that somebody sees as the basis of al-Qaeda-type terrorism. Its primary goals are territorial - ejecting India from Jammu and Kashmir. So in this context it's much less like the analogy Friedman makes, to protests against cartoons about Mohammed, and is more akin to the IRA - a conflict that was nominally "Catholic versus Protestant", but was in fact grounded in a territorial dispute. (Need it be said that Friedman never called for the world's Catholics to rise up in mass protest of IRA bombings in London, let alone argued that such protests would dry up the IRA's ability to recruit members?)

The second problem is that Friedman's calls for mass protest within the Muslim world is an assignment of collective guilt. He apparently sees all Muslims, whatever their sect or nationality - and perhaps especially those who live under autocratic regimes - as having essentially the same values, beliefs, and sympathies toward terrorism. Despite arguing that the roots of Muslim terror emerge predominantly from living under autocratic governments that keep their people "voiceless and powerless and prevent them from achieving their full aspirations in a world where they know how everyone else is living" and that Islam will peacefully thrive as part of a "Multi-ethnic, pluralistic, free-market democracy", his taking to the streets "solution" does nothing to address what he, himself, has declared to be the cause of the problem.

This leaves the question, does Friedman truly believe that the Islamic world is monolithic, such that a terrorist act by a Muslim is attributable to all Muslims unless it is denounced by a "mass demonstration of 'ordinary'" Muslims? That we should assume in relation to Islam (and only Islam) that if there is not a mass protest then there must be mass acceptance?

But at the end of the day, terrorists often are just acting on what they sense the majority really wants but doesn’t dare do or say.

Is this a dodge, "I don't believe that to be true of Islam, but the terrorists do?" If so, it's a distinction that gets past the biggest fans of this type of column. Oh, I know, it's not Friedman's fault if people misunderstand his columns and use them to advance anti-Islamic bigotry - but it's not something he's going to, you know, protest.

In short, Friedman is correct to call on the Muslim world, and perhaps particularly Muslim communities in the free world, to be much more vocal in deploring terrorism that is committed in the name of Islam. If you oppose terrorism that is being committed in your name, quietude is not the answer. If the Muslim communities of the world can take to the streets over blasphemy against Islam from outside of their faith, there's room for demonstration (in not in the form of protests, then at least in the form of public vigils) protesting blasphemy from within - the acts and attitudes of certain Muslims that suggest that terrorism and violence against civilians and "infidels" is legitimate under Islam. When it comes to condemning terrorism, the words of the Islamic community should be loud and sincere. And Friedman is correct that actions often speak louder than words.

At the same time, I disagree with Friedman's implication all terrorist acts committed by Muslims are rooted in religion and are attributable to the collective attitudes of all Muslims. He's also far too simplistic in his suggestion that the type of mass protest movement he demands would have any appreciable impact on terrorist groups, or that even if some protests occurred there would emerge a coherent, sustainable movement.

The type of attitude shift Friedman wants will have to start with the opinion leaders and religious leaders, particularly those within the Islamic communities that are most inclined to spawn terrorists. And it must be facilitated by the political leaders of Arab states - the same autocratic, non-democratic leaders who facilitate and benefit from the status quo that Friedman deplores and describes as the principal cause of Islamic terrorism. It really wouldn't hurt if the U.S. and the regimes of the Arab world started working to dry up the "three rivers of rage" that Friedman sees as the principal causes of Islamic terrorism.

Cognitive Dissonance

These headlines describe the same meeting, right?

• In Meeting With Musharraf, Bush Praises Pakistani Troops
• Musharraf: Bin Laden's Location Is Unknown

From the Post:

Noting two failed assassination attempts on Musharraf, Bush added "there is nobody more dedicated" to tracking down bin Laden or other extremists.

Nobody is more dedicated? Then, I guess, we're doomed - here's Musharraf's take on the hunt for bin Laden:

"He is alive but more than that, where he is, no, it'll be just a guess . . . " Musharraf said in an interview with Washington Post editors and reporters. Pressed on whether the trail had gone cold, he said, "Yes, if you mean we don't know, from that point of view, we don't know where he is."

(No wonder some wags have taken to referencing the world's #1 most wanted fugitive as "Osama bin Forgotten".)

Political Reality and Pakistan

So a Pakistani nuclear scientist and "national hero", who for years has openly lived in a manner far beyond his means, has "surprised" his government by admitting that he sold nuclear weapons technology to states including Iran, North Korea and Libya - but has reassured the government that he acted alone, and nobody in the government or military was aware of his actions. The Pakistani cabinet has recommended that he be pardoned, and the Bush Administration does not appear to be pressing for a full investigation or trial.

Does anybody really believe that this scandal doesn't run most of the way, if not all of the way, to the top of Pakistan's military and political hierarchies? "Wink wink, nudge nudge" is okay, if we deem the nation engaged in atrocious proliferation of the most dangerous weapons technology known to man as a "friend" in the "war on terror"? Or is it that they only sold the technology to two of the three nations in Bush's "Axis of Evil", and it only counts if you "hit the trifecta".

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The Import of Pakistan

A couple of years ago I read Shame by Salman Rushdie - a tale set in a "fictional" nation which obviously represented Pakistan. I was left with a greater understanding of Pakistan, and the firm conviction that Salman Rushdie absolutely detests that nation. President Musharref seems, in many ways, like he stepped off the pages of that book.

Prior to 9/11, the United States was not exactly in Pakistan's cheering corner. In fact, there was considerable strain and concern, relating to Pakistan's rumored trade of weapons technology (including nuclear technology), its development of its own nuclear arsenal, and its conflict with India over Kashmir (with at best indifference and at worst support for cross-border terrorism). There was also the fact that the Taliban was largely a Pakistani movement that had found a home in neighboring Afghanistan, but the significance of that had not yet sunk completely in - the Bush Administration, in fact, was at that time happy to reward the Taliban for its role in suppressing heroin production.

After 9/11, Pakistan became an important but vexing ally in the war against Afghanistan, and it remains crucial to our fighting that war. Musharref seems to recognize that his future is most assured if he has the backing of the United States, and (given his circumstances) has made a considerable effort to do what the Bush Administration asks of him. It was obvious from the outset that this was putting him into greater conflict with Pakistan's religious extremists. Over the past two weeks, that conflict has produced two significant assassination attempts, which were obviously made on the basis of inside information. Musharref escaped in both cases by a matter of seconds. Unless a highly placed mole (or perhaps more than one highly placed mole) is identified, and the flow of information ended, it is unlikely that Musharref's luck will hold.

In today's London Guardian, Peter Preston examines some of the issues surrounding Musharref, his importance in the continuing war effort in Afghanistan, and the improbability that a successor will be as accomodating of the United States.

Pervez Musharraf, for all his evasions, is a pretty determined man. He has India's prime minister coming to town for talks about peace. He has chosen a necessary course and, by and large, sticks to it. But Washington and London, applauding benignly, can take absolutely nothing for granted. Here is a teeming country boasting its own brand new weapons of mass destruction. Knock one piece off the board (or blow up one bridge on time) and everything, including the nature of the finger on the button, changes.

Another 9/11 attack on the White House lawn - or the back side of Downing Street? Maybe. The awful warnings of homeland security are always, rather hysterically, with us. But a calculating, canny Osama has a much easier and more tempting place to strike: and is doing just that. Pakistan is the frontline of 2004, with only one lonely (almost) ex-soldier guarding the gate. When the WMD go off there, then the connections engulf us all.

It's an unpleasant possibility for those of us who have long been concerned that Pakistan's nuclear arsenal might end up in the hands of an extremist government not far removed from the Taliban, or be funneled by a successor government (or during the chaotic period between governments) into the hands of a terrorist group that would like to plant a megaton or two in Los Angeles, London, New York, or Tel Aviv.

Of course, there's also the possiblity that following the assassination of Musharref, Bush might roll in some troops to maintain order, producing yet another occupation of yet another nation that is largely ungovernable. So I guess we should all be rooting for the survival of a self-serving, corrupt, non-elected third world despot "because the alternative is worse". Happy New Year.

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