Desperation?

Following a variety of assertions about how Iraq had become a magnet for terrorists who might otherwise attack us on our own soil, a few weeks ago President Bush informed us that the resistance in Iraq was stepping up its attacks, with significant increases in the numbers of U.S. casualties, because they were "desperate" and losing.

The more progress we make on the ground, the more free the Iraqis become, the more electricity that's available, the more jobs are available, the more kids that are going to school, the more desperate these killers become....

This assertion was soon followed by admissions by others in the Administration that the Iraqi resistance was almost entirely home grown, was larger and better organized that previously (publicly) estimated, and a seemingly desperate scramble by the Bush Administration to reinvent its occupation and to transfer responsibility for its future to the UN or NATO.

Meanwhile, terrorist groups apparently backed by Al Qaeda have been repeatedly striking targets associated with the U.S. side of the occupation of Iraq, on the soil of nations which are associated to at least some degree with our occupation. It is difficult, perhaps even with the intelligence reports to which I have no access, to discern to what degree these terrorist attacks are associated with the "war on terror" as opposed to the "war on Iraq". Or if they are meant to illustrate that our war on Iraq was, in the words of a candidate for the Democratic presidential nomination, a sideshow to the war on terror.

Possible messages behind this series of terrorist attacks include:

1. Any nation which allies itself with the U.S. in its [a] "war on terror" and/or [b] attempt to occupy and transform the government of Iraq will be subject to attack, whether on its own soil or on that of another nation associated with the [a] "war on terror, and/or [b] war on Iraq.



2. Al Qaeda is surviving, perhaps thriving, despite the "war on terror", and it and its associated terrorist groups and cells will continue to strike at western targets, as well as targets belonging to or on the soil of Arab and Islamic regimes they view as corrupt.



3. They will exploit any reasonable opportunity to attack their opponents, real or imagined, and, beyond the obvious declaration that "we're here and your 'war on terror' hasn't stopped us", will allow their targets to infer whatever message they choose to infer.

Of course, in the near complete absense of any form of democracy or free speech, it is difficult to gauge the reaction of the "man on the street" in Saudi Arabia to the attacks which have occurred within its borders. I have read that the attacks have diminished popular support for Al Qaeda. But I'm not sure that Al Qaeda has ever wanted to be liked, so much as feared, or that the respect it wants is anything but the "respect" born of fear. After all, entering into negotiations or attempting to appease international opinion would necessitate making compromises inconsistent with its values and ideals, and it appears that Al Qaeda and its member organizations remain sufficiently powerful in their own right that they don't feel any need to compromise or bend to popular opinion - even in the nations which help fund their efforts.

What the latest attacks perhaps highlight is what certain commentators on the Middle East have been observing for years - that the ultimate consequence of the refusal to condemn suicide bombings, and direct or tacit endorsement of suicide bombings as a tool to achieve political change, would result in a future where Arab nations would be confronted with radicalized internal populations which would not hesitate to use suicide bombings against their own governments. Now it seems that the proverbial chickens have come home to roost.

One last word on suicide bombings. In virtually all cases, these are not isolated, spontaneous, individual actions. There is a significant, sophisticated network behind these bombings, with a refined methodology for recruiting, training, arming, and locking suicide bombers into a particular course of action. The organizations behind these attacks were allowed to grow, and sometimes even funded by governments in the Middle East, with the goal of weakening other dissident groups, including secular opposition or resistance groups, or because their actions seemed to be directed only at other nations. It will be very difficult to extinguish these organizations, even with a very concerted "war on terror" that focuses on their infrastructure, key personnel, and the social and political conditions which help them recruit additional "volunteers". Yet it is perhaps that difficult, thankless, and largely invisible war that is the most important in any effective "war on terror".

Comments