It must be a peace without victory.... Victory would mean peace forced upon the losers, a victor’s terms imposed upon the vanquished. It would be accepted in humiliation, under duress, at an intolerable sacrifice, and would leave a sting, a resentment, a bitter memory upon which the terms of peace would rest, not permanently, but only as upon quicksand.
- Woodrow Wilson, January 22, 1917Many months ago, I read an editorial which decried the "war-loving liberal" - a category of liberal which embraced military force as a way to effect social change in oppressive nations. The editorial touched on some history which suggests that military force is often not the best way to effect such change, and can have unexpected costs and effects which may in fact make matters worse.
Still, whatever your political persuasion, if you care at all about human rights there had to be a part of you which wanted to see Saddam Hussein go. That is, unless you were woefully uninformed about the situation in Iraq under Hussein, as many Americans were. (This widespread ignorance facilitated the reinvention of the invasion as a "liberation", as well as the ability of the Bush II Administration to avoid recognition that many of Hussein's worst offenses took place while he was allied with the Reagan and Bush I Administrations.)
I recall the first time I learned of Hussein's reign of terror. It was back in the early 1980's while I was still in high school, and a news magazine show (perhaps Canada's W5) described the horror Hussein inflicted upon the Iraqi people. I was young enough that it still surprised me that the U.S. would ally itself with such a butcher, even in the context of supporting the enemy of Iran. (Shortly afterward, National Geographic described how President Reagan insisted that the Khmer Rouge be regarded as the official government of Cambodia in exile - because the Cambodian people had the misfortune of being liberated from Pol Pot's genocide by Vietnam. When it comes to politics, how long can one remain both informed and naive?)
Moving forward many years, during a trip to Southeast Asia a Vietnamese man described to me his nation's experience as an occupying power in Cambodia. Within that context, he expressed sympathy for the U.S. occupying forces, which in many areas saw smiling, welcoming faces by daylight, but nothing but Viet Cong fighters once darkness fell. (The official U.S. maps, still hanging in the former Presidential Palace, reflect that reality, with large areas of the South shaded in a color which designated U.S. daytime control and enemy control at night.) The Cambodian people apparently drew a lesson from the Vietnamese experience, and nighttime in Cambodia was an extraordinarily dangerous place for Vietnam's occupying forces. The context for this discussion was Son My, a town that Americans know better as My Lai. The subtext was that Vietnam had acted comparably against smiling Cambodian villagers suspected of harboring guerrillas.
I admit that, since I first learned of his ways, I wanted Hussein (and all like him) removed from the world stage. I believe, however, that there are limits on what can be achieved by military force, and that the aftermath of the application of force can be catastrophic if proper steps aren't taken - steps that can be exceptionally painful and expensive for the outside power seeking to impose "regime change". The consequences of an intervention gone wrong range from the genocide in Cambodia to totalitarianism in Vietnam to the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan. I also recognize that there are geopolitical realities that, whatever their origins, can make it difficult to depose a tyrant without significant concern that the subsequent situation will be worse. (Lon Nol was a corrupt, incompetent leader, whose policies led to the deaths of 10,000 Vietnamese nationals living in Cambodia. His successor, Pol Pot, was far worse.)
Thus, I found myself in a situation where I could not feel comfortable embracing either the "anti-war" position on Iraq, as I cannot stomach the thought of accepting (or refusing to acknowledge) a status quo where rulers like Hussein can impose their tyranny without consequence. (While Hussein's tyranny had clear consequences for his people, he and his cronies continued to live the high life.) At the same time, the calls for "regime change", and the insistence that the post-war occupation and "transformation" of a nation would be easy, reflected either an absurd level of naivete or complete dishonesty. I always expected what even Rumsfeld has now described as a "long, hard slog". While I certainly had concern for the welfare of Iraqi citizens during the course of an invasion, my gravest doubts about the proposed invasion were that we would either mishandle the occupation, withdraw before stabilizing the region, or substitute a new "Hussein" for the one we deposed (a "strong man" who can hold together a fractious nation, while perhaps being more discreet in his associated acts of oppression so as not to immediately embarrass us.) Wasn't it largely the CIA which gave us Hussein in the first place?
My sentiments toward the invasion of Iraq were colored somewhat by the fact that, from the day Bush announced his desire for regime change, I viewed invasion as all-but-inevitable. The Bush Administration's declarations on the war, and how cheap and easy the transformation of Iraq would be, inspired grave reservations about whether the Bush Administration was demonstrating exceptional dishonesty or willful ignorance, whether they were truly prepared for what was likely to happen following invasion, and that they were setting Iraq up for catastrophe due to a probable domestic reaction to the costs and realities of being an occupying power. Failing in the occupation and reconstruction of Iraq carries potential consequences for the region which are extraordinary, and the most probable outcome is devastating for peace, democracy, and security from terrorism.
So now we are the occupying power, and we are facing an inevitable resistance to the occupation. And as the reality of serving as an occupying power becomes more obvious, we are served with endless analysis, often contrived to fit with the author's previously expressed rationalizations for or against invasion. Thomas Friedman, whose positions on the invasion of Iraq may well have inspired the editorial about war-loving liberals, today declares
It's No Vietnam, and tells us,
The people who mounted the attacks on the Red Cross are not the Iraqi Vietcong. They are the Iraqi Khmer Rouge - a murderous band of Saddam loyalists and Al Qaeda nihilists, who are not killing us so Iraqis can rule themselves. They are killing us so they can rule Iraqis.
Let's suppose that he is correct - that it is the Iraqi equivalent of the Khmer Rouge. Does that place us in the position of Vietnam, which liberated Cambodia from the Khmer Rouge only to confront a population which violently resisted its many years of occupation? And no, Thomas, that resistance was not premised upon their desire to see the return of the Khmer Rouge and its killing fields. Granted, the history of conflict and enmity between Cambodia and its neighbors goes back for centuries, but within the context of the occupation of Iraq, how different is that from the growing Arab antipathy toward America?
Worse, we now face a political reality where Bush appears concerned that the occupation of Iraq may cost him reelection. So as Maureen Dowd notes in
Eyes Wide Shut we are being told that things only look bad because they are getting much better. Bush won't commit the forces necessary to provide adequate security because he fears a domestic backlash, and perhaps ultimately a military commitment in Iraq that will leave the U.S. military unable to fulfill its mission elsewhere without implementing a solution that probably would constitute political suicide for the President who implements it - conscription. Bush apparently wishes that things will improve over time, or that other nations will commit forces, so as to alleviate the present security crisis. (In Grumpier Old Men, Burgess Meredith had a
memorable line about wishing.)
Perhaps of more consequence are editorials such as Richard Cohen's
Vietnam It Isn't, or Johann Hari's
The real threat to Iraqis is coming now from Western defeatists, which attempt to convince their increasingly skeptical audiences in Britain and the United States that we have to see things through - even though we still have no idea what that will take in terms of time, lives and money.
On the other side, we have people like Ivan Eland, director of the Center on Peace and Liberty at the
Independent Institute, telling us to
Cut losses: Leave Iraq, and hope that Iraq's own police will be sufficiently supported by military forces from other nations to handle the resultant vacuum. Isn't that how Cambodia achieved "democracy" under the supervision of the UN, following Vietnam's withdrawal? A "democracy" which was never implemented, as after the self-congratulatory withdrawal of the UN and NGO's, Pol Pot's former associate Hun Sen determined that it was better to maintain power by military force than to respect the outcome of an election?
Comments